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This paper presents a preliminary analysis of the potential application of literary 
theory and cognitive language theory to the law, specifically to the judicial process of 
statutory interpretation.  The process of interpreting statutory text has long been the 
subject of a polarized debate in the law and has produced competing approaches for 
carrying out the task of meaning construction.  Equally as intriguing as the merits of 
the debate itself, however, is the staunch reticence among members of the legal 
community to employ insights from other disciplines that have long grappled with 
similar debates over ways in which a written text acquires or is assigned meaning.  
Observations from literary theory and cognitive linguistic theory can be instructive in 
revealing the legal community’s interpretive assumptions and in enriching the 
vocabulary of the legal debate.
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“It seems a simple matter, especially when the law is written down in a book 
with care and detail, just to read it and say what is its meaning.”1  Though we may 
wish that were true, the reality is that ascertaining meaning from any text, legal or 
otherwise, is anything but a simple matter.   
The process of “statutory interpretation” has confounded scholars and judges 
for as long as our system of government has included a scheme that vests judges with 
the responsibility of determining the meaning of a legislature’s words.  Some argue 
that there already are as many theories of how to interpret statutes as there are 
statutes, yet the polarized debate over which theory is the “right one” continues.  In 
fact, arguments over which interpretive theory is better often come at the expense of 
the process of interpretation itself.  The debate is unlikely to subside any time in the 
near future.  Statutes, which are codified legal texts (as opposed to common law), 
have become the dominant source of modern American law, and the construction of 
their meaning occupies the greatest percentage each year of the United States 
Supreme Court docket.2   
The controversy surrounding the process of statutory construction is 
understandable, because as much as legal scholars insist that statutes are a unique 
                                                 
1  Learned Hand, “Is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision?,” The Spirit of Liberty: 
Papers and Addresses of Learned Hand 105 (3d ed. 1977), quoted in Amanda L Tyler, 
“Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons,” Northwestern University Law Review 99 (2005): 
1404. 
2  Ellen P. Aprill and Nancy Staudt, “Theories of Statutory Interpretation (and Their 
Limits),” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 38 (2005): 1899-1900, Westlaw, Thomson West 
(28 March 2006). 
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kind of text (and they are), the interpretation of language lies at the heart of the 
enterprise.  Language is inherently imperfect and thus subject to interpretation.  
Nothing about its codification as law changes that fact, no matter how much we might 
wish it were so.   
Of course, interpreting statutory text does raise special concerns that can 
compound the difficulties associated with ordinary textual interpretation.  Statutes are 
written not by a single author, but by pluralist committees of legislatures — often 
decades or centuries before the interpretive act occurs.  Likewise, statutes are read 
and interpreted not just by a single reader but by a plurality of judges (a minimum of 
13 in any federal case that makes its way to the Supreme Court) who invariably come 
to the bench having had different life experiences and espousing wildly divergent 
political and judicial philosophies.  More importantly, determining the meaning of a 
statute is not something on which a heterogeneous population of readers can simply 
agree to disagree.  Statutes are legally operative and, in the crucible of litigation, must 
be applied to concrete sets of facts to mean something specific — typically either to 
permit or to prohibit particular conduct; two divergent interpretations of a statute 
literally can mean the difference between life and death.        
Given the complexity of this interpretive enterprise, it is no surprise that a 
pointed debate over the process of interpreting the meaning of legal text is deeply 
rooted in the law and has long been the subject of inquiry among jurists, attorneys, 
and legal scholars.  Equally as intriguing as the debate itself, however, is the legal 
profession’s steadfast reluctance to seek guidance from non-legal sources, despite the 
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fact that similar debates over meaning construction have long been brewing in other 
disciplines.  Instead, the tendency in the law has been to view legal texts as unique 
and their interpretation as an enterprise incapable of being informed by non-legal 
sources.  However, at its core, the law ultimately is produced, implicated, interpreted, 
and ultimately reproduced, in a series of interactions between people.  It therefore is a 
“communication” in the same way that any use of language attempts to convey 
meaning between reader and author, or speaker and listener.   
Whether the reluctance to seek guidance from non-legal sources is attributable 
to the common misperceptions about other theories of meaning construction or the 
fear that expanding interpretive horizons necessarily means abandoning constraints 
on meaning that only the law can provide, the result is a willful blindness to concepts 
from other discourses that would otherwise shed light on the process of statutory 
interpretation.   
This paper attempts to expose some of the many contributions that other 
disciplines concerned with the production of meaning – specifically, literary theory 
and cognitive language theory – can make to legal discourse.  The same issues 
animating interpretive legal theories are longstanding points of inquiry in both literary 
theory and cognitive language studies.  Though in literary theory the “text” typically 
falls into the category of what we commonly call “literature,” the same basic 
processes defines what lawyers and judges do, as readers, when they “interpret” the 
language of a statute, or try to discern the meaning behind what the text is intended to 
represent.  Insights from the long history in literary theory and cognitive linguistics of 
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investigating meaning production can help illuminate the many assumptions that 
language interpretation necessarily entails, thereby providing a deeper and richer 
vocabulary to the process. 
Two caveats are required at the outset.  First, this paper represents a 
preliminary investigation into an interdisciplinary project that has considerable 
potential for legal interpretive practices.  A thorough treatment of the many issues 
raised in the crossover from literary and cognitive theory to statutory interpretation is 
beyond the scope of the present inquiry.  Second, this paper does not attempt to 
resolve the “problems” of statutory interpretation but, instead, takes initial steps at 
exposing them more clearly.  The ongoing debates in both legal and other arenas over 
the thorny issues involved in the interpretive process, after all, reflect tensions 
inherent the nature of language itself, which cannot be “solved.”   
This paper is organized as follows.  Section I briefly examines the 
longstanding interpretive problem in legal studies of construing legal statutes – the 
quintessential legal “text.”  Section II provides an overview of the problem and the 
history of textual interpretation generally.  It also discusses a number of assumptions 
driving statutory interpretation that may result in judges often asking the wrong 
questions about “finding” meaning “in” the text.  These assumptions are revealed in 
lessons learned from decades (if not centuries) of language philosophy, which help to 
re-focus the inquiry on meaning as a process of interpretation, rather than merely a 
product of it.     
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Section III examines the issue of “representation” in literary theory.  An 
examination of the major theories exploring the nexus between meaning and its visual 
representation in language offers legal theory a broader vocabulary to discuss the 
same issues that arise when judges confront legislative text and are asked to interpret 
it.  Section III also explores the possibility that contemporary literary theory – 
associated in the law with Derridean deconstruction – typically has been rejected in 
the law primarily because it has been vastly misunderstood.  A proper account of 
deconstruction might not be so easily discounted.   
Finally, Section IV further explores the potential application of cognitive 
linguistic theory to statutory interpretation.  Cognitive linguistic theory offers at least 
as much insight to the process as deconstruction theory and, in fact, shares with 
deconstruction an approach to texts as products of a culture.  In addition, cognitive 
linguistic theory has at least one distinct advantage over literary theories: the 
incorporation of cognitive constraints that might make it more palatable to a 
generation of jurists demanding increased restraint in the interpretive process.  
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I. A Brief History of “Statutory Interpretation” 
  While many legal cases can be resolved simply by applying the words of a 
statute to a particular set of facts, circumstances frequently arise that are not clearly 
answered by the words of a statute under examination.  Indeed, surrounding context 
— including legislative history3 and policy considerations — often suggest a result 
directly at odds with the text standing alone.  In these cases, it is the role of the 
judiciary to interpret statutory language and to apply its meaning to new factual 
situations.  The appropriate method of ascertaining that meaning — and the role of 
the judge as interpreter — has long been the subject of debate.     
Law Professors William F. Eskridge, Jr. and Phillip P. Frickey have identified 
three primary approaches that jurists have used in the past century to discern statutory 
meaning.  “Purposivism” is the approach most often identified with Judge Learned 
Hand, quoted in the Introduction, above.  Under this approach, the judge’s aim is to 
select the interpretation of a statute’s words and phrases that best carries out the 
legislative purpose.  “Intentionalism” requires the judge to limit his or her application 
of the statute to match the original intent of its drafters.  Finally, under the approach 
                                                 
3  “Legislative history” refers to the volumes of written materials that accompany a 
statute but are not enacted into law with the statute itself.  They include transcripts of floor 
debates by individual legislators, red-lined versions of earlier drafts of the statutory text, and 
reports of various legislative committees seeking to explain what the different provisions of 
the statute are intended to accomplish and what they mean.  
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known as “textualism,” the judge attempts merely to apply the statute’s “plain 
meaning” by relying on the words of the statute alone.4   
Throughout most of the twentieth century, the prevailing approach was a 
combination of purposivism and intentionalism.  Specifically, judges interpreted 
statutes based on the intent of the legislature, informed (in situations obviously not 
contemplated by the drafters) by the statute’s more general purpose.  Increasingly, 
however, many judges became frustrated by the indeterminacy of these approaches.  
They turned to a “soft” form of textualism, which involved applying the “plain 
meaning” of a statutory text, mollified by an examination of  legislative history to be 
sure that the apparent “plain meaning” was equally plain to Congress.5  Judge Hand 
and many purposivists and intentionalists rejected the kind of “strict literalism” that 
this approach emphasized.  While they admitted that the words of a statute are of 
paramount importance, they felt strongly that strict literalism would lead to 
unfortunate results, noting that “the meaning of a sentence may be more than that of 
the separate words.”6  
The purposivist and intentionalist approaches ultimately became associated 
with an indeterminacy that made an increasingly more conservative judiciary 
distinctly uncomfortable.  Indeed, Judge Hand specifically described his interpretive 
                                                 
4  William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Legislation: Statutes and the Creation 
of Public Policy (St. Paul (MN): West Publishing, 1995): 514. 
5  Eskridge and Frickey, 514. 
6  John M.Walker, Jr., “Judicial Tendencies in Statutory Construction: Differing Views 
on the Role of the Judge,” New York University Annual Survey of American Law 58 (2001): 
216, Westlaw, Thomson West (21 February 2006).   
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method as an “undertaking of delightful uncertainty.”7  However, he also judged at a 
time when there were fewer statutes overall and therefore fewer such undertakings.  
As the body of statutory law grew over time, even the much stricter textualist 
approach seemed insufficient in reducing uncertainty.  Where meaning was deemed 
“plain,” the case was easy, and the textualist’s inquiry was constrained.  However, 
advocates of this method still would consider extra-textual sources, such as legislative 
history, to confirm plain meaning.  Moreover, they seemed confident that external 
sources could assist them where the text at issue was deemed ambiguous.8   
In the mid-1980s, a movement to develop a more stringent, radical version of 
textualism began to take hold among members of the judiciary.  Identified primarily 
with certain opinions and other writings of United States Supreme Court Justice 
Antonin Scalia, the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist, and United States Court of 
Appeals Judge Frank Easterbrook, this more stringent approach has become popularly 
known as “New Textualism,” a term first coined by Professor Eskridge.  This new 
form of textualism has become increasingly popular in federal courts since then.  The 
most likely explanation for the trend is that, in recent years, the federal judiciary has 
become more politically conservative, and the new textualist movement strongly 
adheres to the traditionally conservative notion of judicial constraint.  
Unlike classic textualism, the new textualist approach is based on two 
relatively radical tenets.  The first is that all that is “law” is the text (and only the text) 
actually adopted by the legislature and signed by the chief executive.  The result is an 
                                                 
7  Walker, 216. 
8  Walker, 218. 
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even “harder” version of the plain meaning rule.9  The second is that the words and, 
therefore, the meaning of statutory text is almost always “plain” (i.e., not ambiguous).   
For the new textualist, statutory text should be understood principally in light 
of “ordinary” usage of the language.10  New textualists will consider the place of a 
word or phrase in a statute, the structure of the statute as a whole, and even other 
related statutory schemes.11  Extra-textual considerations, such as statutory purpose 
and history, are largely rejected.  Instead, the focus is on the words that the legislature 
actually adopted.  Remarkably, however, new textualists also will consider dictionary 
definitions to supply a word’s “ordinary” usage, the assumption being that “the 
dictionary” (though no one dictionary is consulted) is an unquestionably authoritative 
source for a word’s common meaning.   
As a result of their hard line approach, new textualists are more willing than 
their predecessors to accept interpretations that do not appear to produce the correct, 
optimal, or even fair result for the parties.  For example, in Chapman v. United States, 
the statute in question assigned a minimum of five years in prison for the distribution 
of more than one gram of a “mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of 
[LSD].”12  In order to be transmitted to a user, the LSD in question was absorbed onto 
a piece of blotter paper, which weighed a total of 5.7 grams.  Chief Justice Rehnquist 
referenced two different dictionaries to reach the conclusion that the term “mixture” 
                                                 
9  Walker, 219. 
10  William N. Eskridge, Jr., “All About Words: Early Understandings of the ‘Judicial 
Power’ in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806,” Columbia University Law Review 101 
(2001): 1090. 
11  Walker, 219.   
12  Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 457 (1991). 
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included the blotter paper that was used as the medium for transporting the drug, thus 
making the prison sentence for the sale of one dose of LSD disproportionately higher 
than for one dose of equally dangerous and illegal substances, such as heroin or 
cocaine.   
The result is remarkable.  The defendants sold relatively small amounts of 
LSD (one defendant sold fewer than 12,000 doses), but combined with the weight of 
the blotter paper, they received sentences comparable to selling 325,000 doses of 
cocaine or more than a million doses of heroin.13  Judge Easterbrook, who had 
reached the same outcome when the case was on appeal to the Seventh Circuit, did 
not deny the absurd results; he simply did not believe that it was the responsibility of 
judges to rectify.14     
 
II. Meaning as an Interpretive Process 
Despite the identification of three clearly delineated theories of statutory 
interpretation and their documentation in a century worth of cases, many legal 
scholars today maintain that: “The hard truth of the matter is that American courts 
have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory 
interpretation” but, rather, “the American judiciary has ad-libbed for generations on a 
                                                 
13  Andrei Marmor, “The Immorality of Textualism,” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 
38 (2005): 2067, Westlaw, Thomson West (10 April 2006). 
14  Marmor, 2067. 
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very important area of judicial responsibility, and [thus] the conventional wisdom [is] 
that statutory interpretation is a mess.”15
It is in this vein that relatively dogmatic views of what a judge should do 
when she approaches statutory text have taken root.  However, the tendency to search 
for hard-and-fast rules has eclipsed the study of what judges already are doing when 
they are called upon to “find meaning” in written text.  Thus, relatively little attention 
has been paid to the “construction” of meaning – the idea that ascertaining meaning is 
the product of a dynamic process, and not simply a singular matter of unpacking 
statutory words to reveal some essential core. 
Several assumptions about language are embedded in this formulation, which 
insights from both literary theory and cognitive linguistic theory can help tease out.  
Revealing these assumptions can assist interpreters of statutory texts faced with 
disputes over construction by refocusing the inquiry on the process of meaning 
construction rather than merely the product of it.  
A. The Assumption that Words “Contain” Meaning   
The primary fiction under which new textualists are operating is that meaning 
is inherent in linguistic expressions; it is the role of the judge to unpack a word or 
phrase, thereby exposing the meaning that is contained in its core.  This approach 
views ideas and meanings as static objects “held” by words.  It also assumes that 
words and sentences have meaning in themselves, divorced from the speaker that 
                                                 
15  Mullins, 3-4. 
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utters them or the context in which they are uttered.16  Communication, then, is the 
process of a speaker sending that meaning (contained in the words) to a listener, who 
understands its content upon reception.  Together, these assumptions comprise the 
“conduit metaphor,” a way of conceptualizing the reification of meaning.  
The conduit metaphor is a theory first analyzed by Michael J. Reddy to 
explain a large set of observations he had about the ways people talk about meaning, 
interpreting and communicating.  The theory subsequently has been analyzed and re-
analyzed by numerous linguists.  In George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s formulation, 
“the speaker puts ideas (objects) into words (containers) and sends them (along a 
conduit) to a hearer who takes the idea/object out of the word/containers.”17   
For the new textualists, words clearly hold ideas; in the case of statutory text, 
they hold the “law.”  The conduit metaphor is absolutely essential to the core premise 
of the new textualist theory that the statutory text is an end in itself and is all a judge 
needs for determining and applying the law.  It drives their view that the “law” 
consists exclusively of the words actually adopted by the legislature and signed by the 
chief executive.  And it explains their view of the role of the judiciary – simply to 
open up a statute’s word-containers and take out their contents.  Indeed, Justice Scalia 
describes his own views and methodology very much along these lines: “A text . . . 
should be construed rationally, to contain all it fairly means,” and: “I thought we had 
                                                 
16  George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1980), 11. 
17  Lakoff and Johnson, 10-11.   
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adopted a regular method for interpreting the meaning of language in a statute: first, 
find the ordinary meaning of the language . . . .”18    
In many cases, there may be considerable consensus about the meaning we 
attribute to words and thus assume they contain.  In such cases, it may be harmless to 
accept the conduit metaphor or even to remain unconscious about its application.  
However, “when dealing with abstractions – and statutes are abstractions – any theory 
suggesting that words “have” meaning can be dangerous.” 19  The danger lies in one’s 
thinking that all she is doing is objectively attributing meaning to the text, when what 
she is really doing is projecting her own beliefs about meaning onto it.   
To see the system break down, one need only look at an opinion in which two 
or more Justices disagree over the supposed “ordinary” meaning of a particular word 
or phrase in a statute.  If two of the country’s smartest jurists cannot agree, it is 
difficult to argue that the meaning of the critical statutory word is “plain.”  Yet, as 
explained above, new textualists regularly adopt a dogmatic view of a potentially 
ambiguous statute’s plain meaning, either by refusing to recognize alternative uses or 
by wrenching statutory language into artificial clarity.  The result seems to be too 
much “pretending that our laws work better than they ever can.”20   
A classic example is a recent dispute between Justices Scalia and Souter over 
the meaning of the word “impair” in the 1996 Telecommunications Act.  There, 
                                                 
18  Mullins, n. 90 (quoting, respectively, Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997): 23, and Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 
(1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
19  Mullins, n. 90. 
20  Lawrence Solan, “Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory 
Cases,” Wisconsin Law Review 1997 (1997): 283, Westlaw, Thomson West (9 March 2006). 
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Congress disbanded the existing monopoly control over the nation’s local telephone 
markets by allowing new competitors to access and use components of the 
monopolist’s network.   New market entrants, however, were allowed access to a 
particular component only if the monopolist’s failure to provide access to it would 
“impair” the ability of the new entrant to provide the services it sought to offer.21  
Applying this provision, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) held that a 
new market entrant was “impaired” in providing the services it sought to offer if 
denial of access to the network component (i.e., if the new entrant had to find a 
substitute or build its own component) resulted in any increase in cost for the new 
entrant.22  On appeal, Justice Scalia disagreed.  Though he did not purport to know 
precisely what “impair” meant, he felt confident that it was not what the FCC had 
said it meant.  As he explained, the FCC’s assumption that “any increase in cost 
[would] ‘impair’ the entrant’s ability to furnish its desired services is simply not in 
accord with the ordinary and fair meaning of those terms.” 23  
If the meaning of “impair” is truly so plain, then one would not anticipate 
disagreement.  Justice Souter, however, took exactly the opposite view, agreeing with 
the FCC’s decision.  In his view, any increase in cost, no matter how small, could 
fairly be termed an “impairment.”  As he explained, “one can say his ability to 
replace a light bulb is ‘impaired’ by the absence of a ladder . . . even though one 
                                                 
21  AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366, 388 (1999).   
22  AT&T Corp., 389.   
23  AT&T Corp., 390 (emphasis added).   
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could stand instead on a chair, a milk can, or eight volumes of Gibbon.”24  According 
to Justice Souter, this interpretation is a meaning of the word “impair” as ordinary as 
any other.  In other words, an impairment is still an impairment no matter how trivial.  
Justice Scalia (in a rare display of collegiality) responded:  
True enough (and nicely put), but the proper analogy 
here, it seems to us, is not the absence of a ladder, but 
the presence of a ladder tall enough to enable one to do 
the job, but not without stretching one’s arm to its full 
extension.  A ladder one-half inch taller is not, ‘within 
an ordinary and fair meaning of the word necessary, nor 
does its absence “impair” one’s ability to do the job.  
We similarly disagree with Justice Souter that a 
business can be impaired in its ability to provide 
services . . . when the business receives a handsome 
profit but is denied an even handsomer one.25       
 
The debate may be intellectually fascinating, but the practical reality is that 
billions of dollars rode on this exchange, and the issue was decided without citation to 
any legal precedent or theory but, instead, by reference only to the purportedly 
“ordinary” meaning of the text in question.  That the Justices so strongly disagreed 
on how to interpret identical statutory language, however, suggests that the meaning 
was not so plain and, moreover, indicates that two people can hold very different 
belief sets about the meaning of even the most seemingly “ordinary” words.  By 
keeping these belief sets concealed, the Justices are only subjecting themselves to a 
kind of “linguistic enslavement” that risks cutting off the analysis too soon.26  
Recognizing the assumptions animating such a tendency, in contrast, may promote a 
                                                 
24  AT&T Corp., 390 n.11. 
25  AT&T Corp., 390 n.11. 
26  Lawrence Solan, “Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory 
Cases,” Wisconsin Law Review 1997 (1997): 283, Westlaw, Thomson West (9 March 2006). 
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interpretive model that better equips judges to resolve disputes in meaning 
construction.   
 B. The Assumption of an External Reality 
A second, closely-related assumption animating current theories of statutory 
interpretation is that linguistic expressions correspond to an external reality.  For new 
textualists especially, language reflects that reality; otherwise words would not be 
deemed so singularly reliable in capturing meaning.  The notion of a reality existing 
external and a priori to language is, of course, deeply rooted in Western philosophy.  
For Plato, and those theorists that follow him, the investigation of language concerns 
the relationship between words and the things in the world they designate – and our 
ability in thoughts and words to portray accurately the ideals, or the “Forms,” for 
which they stand.  Platonists thus adhere to what linguists call “truth conditional” 
semantics, where the relevant inquiry always concerns language’s ability to represent 
reality.  In such a system, a proposition is true relative to the outside world if it 
describes a state of affairs in that world.   
 The new textualists’ ardent reliance on “plain language” to ascertain meaning 
is reflective of a Platonist world view; otherwise, there would be no sense of statutory 
text having the power to convey meaning and the ability to capture authorial intent.  
“What usually happens when a court ‘interprets’ a statute is that the court attributes 
some correspondence between the statutory words and items in the ‘real world,’ 
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namely a concrete set of facts described in the case.”27  In fact, new textualists are 
quite dogmatic in their view that language has the ability to capture a meaning to 
which everyone can relate and of which everyone has an inherent understanding.  
This view of language likewise supports their claim to eschew external 
sources of meaning as only increasing the likelihood of distraction and confusion; 
rather, the “Forms” can be ascertained from words alone.  The idea that statutory text 
represents “the law,” moreover, produces the method of interpretation that Justice 
Scalia and others argue not only is required by the Constitution, but has the benefit of 
“enabl[ing] the enacting Congress to predict the effects of its language and, just as 
importantly, [to] stay[] the hand of the activist judges who might interpret statutes 
according to their own political preferences.”28  As the above exchange over 
competing meanings of the term “impair” suggests, real predictability can be hard to 
come by.   
At least in the case of “impair,” however, the Justices were relying on their 
own experiences as an interpretive guide.  In contrast, warring dictionary definitions 
often become the touchstone for competing interpretations.  The common judicial 
practice of relying on dictionaries for assistance in construing statutory language 
implicates both of the “folk theories” of language discussed thus far – specifically 
that a word’s “true” meaning is available to interpreters and that it can be effectively 
ascertained.  
                                                 
27  Morell E. Mullins, Sr., “Tools, Not Rules: the Heuristic Nature of Statutory 
Interpretation,” Journal of Legislation 30 (2003): 43-44, Westlaw, Thomson West (10 April 
2006). 
28  Aprill and Staudt, 1901; Solan, “New Text,” 2030-31. 
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C. The Focus on “Product” 
The assumption that a word’s “ordinary” meaning can be found in a dictionary 
is not altogether surprising; indeed, capturing and enumerating such meanings are 
likely the primary functions most of us would ascribe to dictionaries.  The judicial 
practice of relying on dictionaries to determine meaning, however, underscores the 
notion that construing statutory text is solely about finding a product.  This is 
especially true considering that judges who resort to using dictionaries rarely explain 
how the meaning they select for a particular word is the most “ordinary” among the 
many usages that dictionaries typically list for each entry and, as the case discussed 
below will show, there is no consensus on which dictionary is the “correct” one to 
use.  If a judge can find a particular usage in a particular dictionary, the game is over; 
that usage prevails.  But, as noted above, this practice can mask other potentially 
important considerations, such as the specific belief sets that a judge may be 
imparting on a word’s interpretation. 
In addition, even when jurists strive to derive meaning solely from within the 
four corners of the “text,” they often cannot pinpoint meaning with such willed 
precision.  As demonstrated by the classic exchange in Muscarello v. United States,29 
this practice only underscores the tendency to claim transparency for an interpretive 
process that is in fact far murkier and more complicated.  Instead, the exercise often 
degenerates into an examination of seemingly random extrinsic text, not tethered to 
any coherent principle or theory. 
                                                 
29  Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998). 
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Muscarello is one of three cases that the Court considered in the mid-1990s 
under a federal statute imposing an enhanced prison sentence on defendants who “use 
or carry” a firearm in connection with a felony or drug transaction.  In an earlier case, 
Bailey v. United States,30 the question was whether a defendant who drove to a drug 
exchange with a gun in his trunk (and the drugs in the front seat) had “used” a firearm 
in commission of the felony.  The Supreme Court decided nine-to-zero that Bailey 
had not “used” a firearm within the meaning of the statute.  A few years later, 
Muscarello presented almost the identical facts, except that Muscarello was charged 
with “carrying” a firearm rather than “using” it.  The defense argued that the ordinary 
meaning of to “carry a firearm” was to carry on one’s person and, therefore, the 
defendant could not have “carried” it in the trunk of his car.  The government, in 
contrast, argued that carrying a gun in one’s vehicle was an equally legitimate sense 
of the word “carry.”   
The Court ruled five-to-four in favor of the government, but not before 
looking to multiple dictionaries with varying definitions; several passages from the 
Bible; Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, and Herman Melville’s Moby Dick to 
determine the “ordinary use” of the term.31  The Court also conducted its own 
lexicography by searching through a database of thousands of newspaper and 
magazine articles for instances of the words “carry,” “vehicle,” and “weapon.”32  The 
four dissenting Justices turned to their own bevy of dictionaries, biblical passages, 
                                                 
30  Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). 
31  Lawrence Solan, “The New Textualists’ New Text,” Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review 38 (2005): 2051-52.  Westlaw, Thomson West (28 March 2006).    
32  Solan, “New Text,” 2052. 
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and literary allusions, including a different translation of the Bible, two major novels, 
the poetry of Oliver Goldsmith, Rudyard Kipling’s verse, Bartlett’s Familiar 
Quotations, and even popular films and television shows such as The Magnificent 
Seven and M*A*S*H.33  For a Court so expressly reticent to use extra-textual 
evidence of legislative intent, turning to this array of literary and lexicographic 
sources to ascertain the “plain and ordinary” meaning of a term seems particularly 
incongruous.   
The practice of relying on dictionaries (or other singular instances of word 
usage) gives rise to other potentially problematic assumptions – including, for 
example, the necessity of making judgments about categorization, such as what does 
and does not constitute the category of “a mixture containing LSD” in Chapman.  The 
tendency on the part of new textualists, however, is to view categories as consisting 
of necessary and sufficient conditions.  Regarding “the meaning of a word [or 
category] as the set of conditions that must obtain for a statement using that word to 
be “true”34 seems an especially useful, if not obvious, principle for a rule-oriented 
profession.  Yet, any one of the cases cited in this paper as an example of how the 
“plain and ordinary meaning” approach often falls short suggests that it can be 
difficult, if not impossible, to define words in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions.   
                                                 
33  Muscarello, 143-44. 
34  Solan, “New Text,” 2039. 
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This is true even for statutory terms that seem relatively more tangible than 
“use” or “impair.”  A well-worn example (among many) in the first-year law school 
curriculum is to suppose the existence of a statute stating, “No vehicles in the park.” 
Ask an audience to define “vehicle,” and certain obvious attributes come to mind.  
We might all agree that “cars” are clearly prohibited, but scooters, skateboards, and 
wheelchairs add complexities that begin to make the process quite confounding.  
The tendency in the law is to view the notion of a category as an a priori conceptual 
structure, membership in which can be defined by necessary and sufficient 
conditions.35   
An item or idea either falls within the category or outside of it.  Lakoff has 
shown, however, that we tend to categorize in terms of “radial categories,” consisting 
of a central model with various extensions that, though related to the model, 
nevertheless cannot be generated by rule.  Instead, we judge the propriety of an item’s 
inclusion in a category in accordance with “prototype effects” – as better or worse 
examples of that category. 36  To take the “vehicle” example a step further, we might 
judge a “car” to be a better example of the category of things we call “vehicles” than 
a “skateboard,” not because car satisfies a predetermined set of conditions that 
skateboard does not, but because car is a better (more prototypical) example of what 
we think of when we picture a “vehicle.” 
                                                 
35  Steven L. Winter, A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and Mind (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001): 69. 
36  Winter, 71-78. 
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This type of reasoning cannot be explained by traditional rationalist models, 
yet the process is nevertheless systematic and constrained.  There is little worry, for 
example, that “dog” would be posited as a good example of the category of things we 
call vehicles.  Such a process no greater uncertainty than the use of dictionaries; in 
fact, the practice correctly shifts the inquiry from away from the notion that meaning 
in inherent in linguistic expressions and toward the mental processes involved in 
producing meaning.   
There is already evidence of this type of reasoning process at work in 
statutory interpretation.  In McBoyle v. United States, the question was whether a 
federal statute prohibiting interstate transportation of stolen “vehicles” applied to 
airplanes.  Justice Holmes concluded that it did not, reasoning that: 
Fair warning should be given to the world in language 
that the common world would understand. . . . When a 
rule of conduct is laid down in words that evoke in the 
common mind only the picture of vehicles moving on 
land, the statute should not be extended to aircraft 
simply because it may seem to us that a similar policy 
applies.37
  
As Justice Holmes seemingly recognized, a particular meaning is “ordinary” not 
simply because we can find some instance of its usage.  Yet, that is precisely what the 
Justices in the Muscarello case were so intent on finding – a reference in a dictionary, 
newspaper article, work of literature (or even a statistical average among these 
sources) that supported their own conclusion. 
                                                 
37  McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S.25, 26 (1931) (emphasis added).  Winter discusses 
this case in depth, noting that prototype theory provides a much better account of the decision 
than an analysis focused on ordinary meaning.  Winter, 37 and 200-206. 
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Even with more self-conscious reasoning, of course, challenging questions 
still remain, for example, “whether courts must limit their interpretation of statutory 
words to prototypical instances, even in the face of evidence that the legislature had a 
more expansive meaning in mind.”38  Such questions, however, are an integral part of 
the process – the careful communicative “duet” between the legislative and judicial 
branches that pragmatist Herbert Clark (discussed in Section IV) envisions, that the 
Constitution requires, and that ultimately is impossible to eliminate.     
 
III. A Single Interpretive Schema 
The debate over how language produces meaning is not unique to the law; 
rather, it is well-entrenched in other discourses, including in literary theory.  It is 
traceable as far back as Plato and continues in full force in schools of literary 
criticism today.  Nonetheless, the knee-jerk reaction by most lawyers, legal scholars, 
and certainly most judges is that legal text and literary text are such vastly different 
forms of communication that these two discourse communities have nothing 
whatsoever to offer one another.  Richard Posner, a federal appeals court judge and 
lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School captures this reticence in his review 
of Literary Criticisms of Law, by Guyora Binder and Robert Weisberg, a relatively 
recent addition to a field seeking to explore the intersection of law and literature.  
Concluding what many lawyers and legal scholars might guess without reading either 
the book or Judge Posner’s review of it, Judge Posner writes:  
                                                 
38  Solan, “New Text,” 2046. 
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The authors are fascinated by, and minutely examine, a 
set of scholarly literatures that have no practical 
significance for law; some of them are not about law at 
all.  The book has no pedagogic function or potential 
that I can see, will be in accessible by reason of its 
length and its heavy weight of erudition to all but the 
tiniest sliver of the legal profession (even to most law 
professors), and contains nothing that could be used 
to understand or improve the law . . . .39  
 
The bulk of Judge Posner’s critique turns on the very basic and undeniable 
fact that the law, stated simply, is not “literature.”  Defining “literature” is not a 
simple task, though the distinction between “literature” and other types of written 
discourse, such as legal writing, is important, because “[a] precondition to the 
application of literary theory to legal interpretation is their initial separation.”40  The 
task is not as simple as it may seem, because “literature” only became a discrete 
enterprise in the nineteenth century when two conceptual divisions developed.  The 
first was a division between scientific and expressive discourses; the second was a 
functional division of “letters” into categories that separated the instrumental from the 
aesthetic and the prosaic from the poetic.  But ultimately, they conclude that: “The 
very category of literature – writing presented as art – was a creature of Romanticism, 
and insofar as we continue to view literature as an autonomous category of writing or 
experience, we moderns remain committed to Romantic aesthetics[,]”in particular, 
                                                 
39  Richard Posner, review of Literary Criticisms of Law, by Guyora Binder and Robert 
Weisberg, Stanford Law Review 53 (2000-2001): 195-96 (emphasis added), HeinOnline, 
William S. Hein & Co., Inc. (6 March 2006).  
40  Binder and Weisberg, 7. 
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“the emergence of a purely aesthetic sensibility for receiving writing, defined by 
contrast to a merely instrumental sensibility.”41   
Interestingly, Judge Posner suggests that an analysis of legal texts as literature 
might well be worthwhile.  Here, though, he squarely means the analysis of the 
“imagery, narrative techniques, character portrayal, voice, tone, and other literary 
properties” of a legal text, but not of the law as a “‘cultural activity’ and ‘a process of 
meaning making’” that Binder and Weisberg seek to explore.42  Judge Posner’s 
reaction to such an attempt is simply that a literary critic cannot be expected to have 
much to say about law so conceived – hence his charge that their book has nothing 
useful to say about the law, how we understand it, or how it might be improved. 
Judge Posner’s sweeping dismissal of the application of literary theory to law 
as an enterprise ultimately may have less to do with the merits of any of its insights 
and more to do with the nature of Binder and Weisberg’s particular analysis – 
namely, they seem to gloss over the undeniable fact that the law is different from 
literary text.  In addition, their analysis is limited largely to a discussion of “the law” 
at a high level of abstraction rather than to specific examples where the law may be 
analyzed as a text.43  The assumption here, however, is that “law” can never be 
analyzed as text, that the law uniquely contains or produced meaning in a way that 
other texts do not.  
                                                 
41  Binder and Weisberg 9, 11-12. 
42  Posner, 196. 
43  Posner, 196. 
 25
For all the differences between legal statutes and other texts, however, they 
share more in common than members of the legal profession seem willing to admit.  
Indeed, precisely the same issues over how language produces meaning have been 
debated for centuries in literary theory, with similar assumptions concerning 
“interpretation” and “representation” animating theories far more diverse than those 
at play in statutory interpretation.  Ironically, even new textualists are to some degree 
embracing the very language of literary theory that they are so quick to reject.  Far 
from shunning it, moreover, the legitimacy of their approach to meaning production 
actually may depend on it.  
A. The Issue of Representation 
As noted above, the hallmark of new textualism is the notion that meaning is 
inherent in language; statutory text carries that meaning and, more often than not, its 
language is transparent enough for readers to see it and known what it means.  The 
debate in statutory interpretation thus can be analogized to the parallel debate in 
literary theory in that both have at their core the same schema about the way in which 
interpretation occurs.  Specifically, both debates implicate the same dichotomy about 
the way in which language produces meaning.  At one end of the divide are 
“formalists” – new textualists and, in literary theory, many New Critics – who 
contend that language is transparent and has inherent meaning, which can be 
transmitted like an object from the speaker or author to the listener or reader.  The 
assumption here – identified above as the “conduit metaphor” – is that words contain 
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meaning and that a reader or listener should be able to unpack spoken or written text 
to uncover the inherent meaning that the speaker or author intended to convey.   
At the other end of the spectrum are those who believe that meaning is 
entirely socially constructed and context-dependent.  For adherents to the social 
construction or “social coherence” view, meaning resides somewhere exterior to the 
text.  “The social coherence view of meaning is related to a view of indeterminacy of 
reference of language terms.  On this view, words do not ‘fit’ the world at all[.]”44  
Instead, the relationship between words and “reality” is arbitrary.  Depending on the 
particular school to which she subscribes, a social constructionist might say that the 
meaning of any single term is determined solely by its relationship to other terms in 
the same language system; or that meaning is determined by convention, or by 
agreement of an “interpretive community.”45    
Notably, even the latter view starts from the premise that words alone 
establish certain interpretive parameters.  Both views, therefore, are really two 
conclusions drawn from the same conceptual premises – namely, the conduit 
metaphor and the view that language has an “inside” and an “outside.”  Formalists 
conclude that meaning is inside the text, whereas social constructionists argue that 
meaning comes from the outside.  Regardless of viewpoint, both legal and literary 
theorists have tended to conceive of language as a material object with physical 
boundaries demarking its inside and outside, and to insist that meaning is deeply 
connected to this linguistic structure, whether it comes from within or without. 
                                                 
44  Winter, 7. 
45  Winter, 7. 
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 Two ironies lie buried in this idea, which the present analogy to literary theory 
is able to help unearth.  First, though, like Platonists, the new textualists exalt 
language’s power to capture single-handedly a reality that exists exterior to it, so 
much so that courts typically should eschew reliance on virtually all other extra-
textual evidence of meaning, they actually miss one of Plato’s central points – 
language, especially written language, dilutes reality.  If a reality exists a priori to 
language, any expression of that reality in words is one step removed from it.  In 
other words, while language may be absolutely necessary to our ability to express the 
“things in the world it designates,” language is nevertheless always and only a 
representation of reality (judged based on the accuracy of its representation), and not 
reality itself.  In the Phaedrus, this issue of representation was extended to the written 
word, and the inquiry became doubly complicated.  If language itself interferes with 
truth, then written language is even more faulty, because the symbols we use to 
represent words only takes us further away from the truths that those words 
symbolize.46    
 Second, at the same time that they tout language’s ability to represent reality, 
new textualists are remarkably quick to apply theories of language that are directly 
contrary to the Platonic world view.  Namely, most jurists rightfully espouse the view 
that law is its own system of signs, the truth value of which does not depend on any 
nexus to an external reality.  In addition, within such a system, it is entirely 
reasonable to determine the meaning of a word by comparison to what it is not, rather 
                                                 
46  The “speech/writing binary,” to which this classic Platonic assumption gives rise, is 
discussed in more detail in the following Chapter. 
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than to determine what it is or what it represents.  Before examining the application of 
these principles, a brief explanation of their genesis is in order. 
In contrast to Plato, philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche maintained that we do 
not have the ability to conceive of the essential qualities called the Forms.  That 
“Truth” is unknowable renders the question whether language corresponds to it a 
flawed inquiry in the first instance.  Central to Nietzsche’s view of language is that 
the “thing-in-itself” (Immanuel Kant’s term for the real object independent of our 
awareness of it) is impossible even for the creator of a language to grasp.47  Though 
we believe that when we speak of certain things – trees, leaves, and tables, for 
example – we have knowledge of the things themselves, all we really possess are 
metaphors created by the cognitive process of translating concepts into words.  These 
metaphors consist of multiple layers of substitutions that move us further and further 
away from the things-in-themselves.  Truth thus is nothing more than a “mobile army 
of metaphors”48 that, over time and through convention, become so ingrained in our 
experience that we come to believe that they are exactly the same as the things-in-
themselves.  For Nietzsche, then, everything resides in language and language alone.  
Accordingly, it is language that gives rise to concepts – and not concepts that give 
rise to language.   
Ferdinand de Saussure agreed with Nietzsche, but he changed the inquiry to 
focus instead on the internal constitution of linguistic signs, not on what those signs 
                                                 
47  Friedrich Nietzsche, “From On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense,” in The 
Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, ed. Vincent B. Leitch (New York: Norton, 2001), 
877.  
48  Nietzsche, 878. 
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designate.  This “structuralist” approach focuses on how the elements of a language 
relate to each other in the present (synchronically) rather than over time 
(diachronically).  For Saussure, there is only an arbitrary relationship between a 
linguistic sign and the thing it signifies.49  Saussure also agreed with Nietzsche that 
language gives rise to concepts, not the other way around: “[t]here are no pre-existing 
ideas, and nothing is distinct before the appearance of language.”50  What, then, is 
“Truth?”  For structuralists, it is nothing more than a matter of agreement.   
Critics of structuralism, Platonist among them, have a difficult time accepting 
this view that meaning is unattached to the expression of some non-linguistic Form.  
To some extent, their fear of complete indeterminacy is unwarranted.  By “arbitrary” 
Saussure did not mean that a word could mean anything anyone wanted it to mean in 
a particular instance.  To the contrary, he saw language as a social phenomenon that 
was entirely dependent on an agreement between the speaker and listener to interpret 
linguistic signs in a similar manner.  Accordingly, he rejected the view that any one 
individual could effect linguistic change; however, that is not to say he believed 
change impossible.  He simply argued that one person acting alone cannot prevail.51  
For example, I cannot decide today to call the sun the moon and expect meaning to 
flow from my decision automatically.  However, if I persuade at least one other 
person to accept my proposal, then we have an agreement.  Communication can be 
                                                 
49  Saussure, Ferdinand de, “From Course in General Linguistics,” in The Norton 
Anthology of Theory and Criticism, ed. Vincent B. Leitch (New York: Norton, 2001), 964.  
50  Saussure, 965. 
51  Saussure, 968. 
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successful, and nothing about the word “moon” when referring to the sun is 
inappropriate; there is no “reality” being violated. 
Applying these concepts to legal interpretation, we see that a “striking feature 
of legislative discourse is the general irrelevance of truth.”52  Statutory concepts often 
have no “natural” meaning; instead, their meaning is wholly supplied by the 
legislature, and possibly later by the judiciary through the interpretive process.  In 
other words, it is not necessarily important or relevant that statutory words be “true” 
in the Platonic sense, because the underlying purpose of legislative discourse is only 
“the creation of laws within the bounds of which the addresses are to be required to 
act.”53  As a result, words and concepts can be defined and limited solely at the behest 
of the legislature.   
The “No vehicles in the park” statute references above is a good example. 
There is no truth-conditional sense of the word “vehicle,” but only the range of 
objects that the legislature defines as covered by the statute.  Thus, there is no 
“reality,” no real “vehicle” that is prohibited.  In fact, the legislature might decide to 
define “vehicle” to include not only motorized vehicles but also largely unanticipated 
items, such as baby carriages, skateboards, or even pogo-sticks.  Moreover, it might 
exclude items one would expect to be included, such as emergency vehicles or 
“military trucks participating in a parade.” 
                                                 
52  M.B.W. Sinclair, “Law and Language: The Role of Pragmatics in Statutory 
Interpretation,” University of Pittsburgh Law Review 46 (1985): 386-87, Westlaw, Thomson 
West (9 March 2006). 
53  Sinclair, 387. 
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At a certain level, this Sausseurean proposition may not be so profound; 
indeed, it suggests simply that meaning is a matter of convention – or, at least, of 
express definition.  But Saussure says something distinctly more radical: in language 
there are only differences, and these differences exist wholly without positive terms.54   
These differences can take two forms: material and conceptual.55  For example, I 
know what “red” is because it is not “bed,” “led,” “rid,” or “rod” (material 
differences).  I also know what red is because it is not blue, pink, or magenta 
(conceptual differences).  But whereas a “difference” generally implies that there is 
some positive term to which the differing one is being contrasted (for example, I 
know what the sun is because it is not the moon), in Saussure’s view, everything in 
language is purely relational.  The identification of a difference does not depend on 
the prior existence or knowledge of the idea or the entity to which it is compared (the 
moon in this example).  Thus, even if one accepts a system of meaning based solely 
on contrasting effects, to embrace Saussure, one must also abandon any sense of 
language as a substance.  For structuralists, language is purely a form.  
For all of the fear associated with the notion that meaning can be informed by 
something other than the words actually adopted by a legislature, both new textualists 
and adherents to other forms of statutory interpretation have shown a remarkable 
tendency to accept even this most radical Sausseurean principle.  In fact, judges 
commonly arrive at statutory meaning by considering not only what was said, but 
                                                 
54  Saussure, 972.   
55  Saussure, 969-71.   
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what was not said in the course of a legislative enactment.  This principle is well-
entrenched in statutory interpretation.   
For example, Bailey v. United States, presented the Supreme Court with 
virtually the same set of facts as Muscarello, discussed above.  In Bailey, however, 
the defendant was charged with “using” the firearm located in his trunk rather than 
“carrying” it.  The Court discussed the juxtaposition of the two terms in the statute as 
follows: 
We assume that Congress used two terms because it 
intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous 
meaning. While a broad reading of “use” undermines 
virtually any function for “carry,” a more limited, active 
interpretation of “use” preserves a meaningful role for 
“carries” as an alternative basis for a charge.56  
 
In other words, in defining “use” the Court relied in part on the Sausseurean 
proposition of conceptual differences.  They reasoned that, because both terms appear 
in the legislation, they cannot be deemed to mean the same thing.  Moreover, they 
derived a basis for their definition of “use” by contrasting it to “carry,” noting that the 
use of two different words necessitated a difference in meaning. 
 New textualists often profess a hard-line Platonist view of the interpretive 
process whereby words represent exterior realities that any reader can understand 
simply by reading the words themselves.  Yet, as we have seen, new textualists in 
practice apply many modes of interpretation that, as literary theory illuminates, are 
antithetical to the Platonic world view and undermine its fundamental assumptions.  
By self-consciously recognizing this and embracing concepts derived from literary 
                                                 
56  Bailey, 145-46. 
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theory, new textualists could employ a broader and richer vocabulary to frame and 
convey more concretely a comprehensive interpretive theory uniquely tailored to 
statutory interpretation. 
B. A Legitimate Interpretive Method 
Before concepts from literary theory can be employed, however, certain myths 
associated with its “message” require debunking.  The application to law of “literary 
theory,” broadly construed, tends to come under considerable fire especially from 
conservatives, who have tended to view its introduction into legal arenas as an 
attempt by the left to destabilize traditional (read: conservative) interpretations and 
thus nothing but a rich resource for leftist critiques.  The early 1990s in particular 
produced a surge in scholarship purporting to constitute a “postmodern 
jurisprudence.”57  That surge arguably is attributable to the “culture wars” of the late 
1980s and early 1990s when, even within the field of literary criticism, strains of 
postmodern literary theory became synonymous with leftist politics, and 
“conservatives accused postmodernists of making all things relative, to the detriment 
of the canon, critical values, and the culture at large.”58  The “construction of the 
individual by culture” became a central theme in criticism during this period, and so 
too in the then-“emerging category of postmodern jurisprudence.”59   
                                                 
57  Jack Balkin, “What is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?,”  Michigan Law Review 90 
(1992): 1977 n. 25 for citations to Fish and numerous additional works. 
58  Jennifer Howard, “The Fragmentation of Literary Theory,” Chronicle of Higher 
Education, 16 December 2005, A12. 
59  Balkin, “Postmodern,”1977 n. 25.  See also David Aram Kaiser and Paul Lufkin, 
“Deconstructing Davis v. United States: Intention and Meaning in, Ambiguous Requests for 
Counsel,” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 32 (2005): 738, Westlaw, Thomson West 
(15 March 2006). 
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At the same time, however, Justice Scalia, appointed to the Supreme Court in 
1986, had already become one of the law’s foremost intellectual leaders.  As 
explained above, Justice Scalia vehemently supports a “constitutional jurisprudence 
of tradition, coupled with a return to an interpretive theory of plain meanings for 
statutes and original intention with respect to the Constitution.”60  Where a case 
requires textual interpretation – such as where the words of the Constitution or a legal 
statute is implicated – Justice Scalia firmly rejects extra-textual considerations, such 
as a statute’s social context, the history surrounding its enactment, subsequent history 
of its operation, and even efforts to discern the harm it was intended to address.  The 
assumption is that considerations outside the text rarely can contribute to our 
understanding; to the contrary, such extra-textual phenomena can cause deception.   
One of the central problems in describing postmodernism’s influence and 
potential application has been its relationship to deconstruction theory, associated 
primarily with the writings of Jacques Derrida.61  Deconstruction has been poorly 
defined in law and as a result largely disfavored.  Specifically, two assumptions about 
deconstruction theory have undermined its utility.  The first assumption is a 
functional critique and concerns a common misperception about deconstruction 
theory.  Deconstruction, construed (broadly) as an obsession with or fixation on the 
                                                 
60  Balkin, “Postmodern,” 1966.  
61  Kaiser and Lufkin, 738.  Certainly, deconstruction is associated with the work of 
Derrida; however, its full legacy also is attributable to the vast body of writings produced in 
response to Derrida.  Derrida’s death in 2004 provided an opportunity for reconsideration of 
the influence of deconstruction in many disciplines, including the law.  Kaiser and Lufkin, 
737.  Rather than close the door on deconstruction’s application to law, its reconsideration 
may shed new light on its potential contribution.   
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ambiguities of meaning that emerge when a text is inspected, “has obvious if 
unacceptable implications for legal interpretation, because fixity of meaning is 
necessary to minimize legal uncertainty and cabin judicial discretion.”62  Thus, the 
primary fear associated with its application to the law is that it will produce a 
fragmented jurisprudence – an undesirable method of legal interpretation that 
“celebrates surfaces, irony, and pastiche, and eschews master narratives because those 
are postmodernist themes and so that is what a postmodern jurisprudence should look 
like.”63  As one of the very purposes of codifying law into written statutes is to 
provide certainty and predictability for the population that they govern, any theory 
that serves only to undermine that certainty and predictability has no place in 
jurisprudential theory.    
The second assumption raised as a criticism is a substantive one in that it 
constitutes a purely leftist assault on traditional juridical values.  This allegation is not 
unrelated to the first assumption, and the reality is that many literary 
deconstructionists have associated themselves with the political left: 
When deconstruction moved from literature 
departments to the legal academy, it was modified 
further.  Legal academics on the left, particularly 
feminists and members of the Critical Legal Studies 
(CLS) movement, saw deconstruction as a way of 
challenging legal orthodoxies.  They assumed pretty 
much without question that they could adapt 
                                                 
62  Posner, 205. 
63  Balkin, “Postmodern,” 1973, n. 16, n. 17.  Quoting Robert Post in his review of 
Fredric Jameson’s book on postmodernism, Balkin writes that “it is ‘obvious[] that 
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deconstructive techniques to critique unjust legal 
doctrines and advocate more just arrangements.64   
 
However, this assumption on its own is problematic.  As the following discussion 
shows, Derridean deconstruction theory, properly construed, actually can be 
extremely beneficial to the traditionally more conservative new textualists.65
Based in large part on these misperceptions, the law’s extremely negative 
reaction to the importation of deconstruction theory is predictable.  Moreover, so 
construed, the criticism is justified, and it is here that the application of literary 
theory, especially deconstruction, to law finds itself most at odds with the goals of 
ordinary legal interpretation and jurisprudence.  If the goal of deconstruction is solely 
to destabilize a written text, in most instances with a hidden political agenda, then 
legal interpretation has little use for it.   
That is not, however, deconstruction’s only, or even its primary, function.66  
Deconstruction provides insights into language and meaning that are critical to our 
understanding not only of legal institutions as products of our culture but specifically 
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to the assumptions underlying the meaning for which judges search in statutory text.  
In this vein, deconstruction and cognitive linguistic theory actually share much in 
common.  Both approaches are focused on revealing tensions in a text and uncovering 
the assumptions underlying language use; both approaches seek to bring these 
otherwise hidden assumptions to the analytical surface.   
As applied to legal meaning, deconstruction can illuminate “the sensitivity of 
legal meaning to changes in interpretive context, and [can help] uncover[] the 
competing policies and potentialities buried in the words and expressions of legal 
texts.”67  The real connection between deconstruction and legal interpretation thus 
may lie in deconstruction’s method – something that many critics are quick to 
overlook.  Derridean deconstruction is, at bottom, a technique for reading texts, and 
Derrida himself remained loyal to the text by hinging his analysis always on close 
readings. 
One of Derrida’s many significant contributions to literary theory was his 
masterful deconstruction of the speech/writing binary.  By deconstructing the 
speech/writing binary, Derrida demonstrated that writing can add meaning to oral 
speech; it can provide its own kind of presence rather than just signify the author’s 
physical absence.  As explained below, far from undermining it, this conclusion adds 
considerable legitimacy to the new textualists’ view of language.  
The speech/writing debate has a long history in literary theory.  The origin of 
the speech/writing dichotomy is traceable to Plato’s Phaedrus.  There, Plato 
                                                 
67  Balkin, “Deconstruction,” 114. 
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notoriously condemned writing and exalted speech as the proper vehicle through 
which one can obtain true knowledge about the world.  That condemnation comes 
from the Platonic view that, as compared to writing, speech is closer to “Truth” and 
thus is better able to represent reality.   
In a world premised on the existence of absolute Truth, any “representation” 
is inherently inferior.  For Plato, the distance between representation and truth was 
sufficiently vast so as to render them polar opposites, and it was precisely this 
dichotomy that gave rise to his negative view of aesthetic representation.  Artistic and 
literary representations for Plato were mere imitations of nature, necessarily removed 
from the Real and likely to cause mischief and confusion.  “[R]epresentation . . . 
produce[s] a product which is far from truth [and] also forms a close, warm, 
affectionate relationship with a part of us which is, in its turn, far from intelligence.  
And nothing healthy or authentic can emerge from this relationship.”68  Plato’s view 
of representation and resulting charge against aesthetics derives from “mimesis,” the 
Greek word for imitation. 
More than two millennia later, Derrida termed this bias in favor of speech 
“logocentrism,” which he explained in terms of “presence.”  According to Derrida, 
logocentrism is a “metaphysics of presence” motivated by a desire for a 
“transcendental signified,” or a meaning that transcends all signs.69  If “presence” is 
“the essence of the signified,” then the proximity of the signifier to the signified 
                                                 
68  Plato.  “From Republic, Book X,” in The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, 
ed. Vincent B. Leitch (New York: Norton, 2001), 75-76. 
69  Jacques Derrida, “From Dissemination,” in The Norton Anthology of Theory and 
Criticism, ed. Vincent B. Leitch (New York: Norton, 2001), 1822-23. 
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suggests a better ability to express meaning.  Whereas a speaker is present at the 
moment of communication, the author of a written text typically is not.  If a reader 
and writer were present simultaneously, the writer undoubtedly would speak rather 
than write.  In such a logocentric system, writing always is only a mere substitute for 
speech and thus has been relegated to a secondary status in Western thought.   
In Dissemination Derrida carries out this long overdue task of exposing what 
animates the speech/writing binary by carefully and methodically examining the 
textual moment in the Phaedrus where Plato compares writing to a “drug,” or 
“pharmakon,” which in Greek can mean either “remedy” or “poison.”70  Derrida’s 
analysis is masterful but complex, and this paper does not attempt to capture it in full.  
Instead, there are several key points to be made both about the binary’s 
deconstruction and about what that deconstruction could mean for the process of 
statutory interpretation. 
The ambiguity of the word “pharmakon” is crucial; Derrida’s rigorous 
analysis of its multiple meanings, and its usage by Plato both within the Phaedrus and 
in other contexts, enables him to demonstrate the term’s inherent instability.  
Although Plato invokes the word “pharmakon” in the context of a myth that is 
universally construed as condemning writing in favor of speech, Derrida shows how 
its meaning “slips” in transmission, even within the text of the Phaedrus itself.  For 
Derrida, this slippage is proof that the “essential meaning” of the term cannot be 
contained within traditional, fixed Platonic categories.  By analogy, Derrida argues 
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that the allegedly clear-cut distinction between “speech-as-presence” and “writing-as-
absence” is not as fixed as Plato would have us believe.  Rather, Derrida shows that 
both speech and writing have elements of presence and absence, and that both operate 
positively and negatively on memory.71  The result is a destabilization of the 
speech/writing binary opposition.    
What is of greater interest to Derrida, however, is how the discourse of 
logocentrism transforms speech’s de facto primacy to its primacy de jure.  In other 
words, Derrida probes the assumption in Western thought that speech is “better” than 
writing simply because of its alleged primary relationship to presence.  The answer is 
partially bound up in our tendency to rely on binary oppositions in the first instance.  
Such binary pairs certainly exist in nature (day/night is a good example) and may 
even conform to our natural instinct to think antagonistically.  The danger, however, 
is that the practice of defining one of a pair in terms of the absence of the other 
establishes a hierarchical relationship.   
While we might not see the harm in defining “night” as “not day,” when we 
examine the binaries of white/black and man/woman, the problem of defining “black” 
as “not white” or “woman” as “not man” is more readily apparent: the second term in 
the pair becomes associated with that which is lacking.  The result is that within each 
opposing pair, one term becomes privileged and the other marginalized.  What 
Derrida unearths is that merely by positing the binary structure, we necessarily 
elevate the former over the latter in a value-laden judgment. 
                                                 
71  Derrida, “From Dissemination,” 1859-60.   
 41
Derrida’s goal in deconstructing these pairs is to excavate the bases on which 
the binary is constructed and to expose what is at stake in its preservation.  What is 
perhaps most remarkable about his methodology is that this exposure comes about by 
his destabilization of both terms in the hierarchy.  His intent is not simply to reverse 
the opposition, but to jettison it entirely in favor of the “free-play of meaning” – or an 
understanding of opposites in an inherently non-hierarchical way.  In this way, he 
suggests that Western thought’s elevation of speech over writing is a function not of 
the relative value of each as compared to the other, but as a subconscious – and 
potentially illegitimate – consequence of the dichotomy itself.   
The close reading in which Derrida engages bears striking similarity to the 
process that judges encounter when searching for meaning in an ambiguous statutory 
word or phrase.  Ironically, however, his conclusion lends legitimacy to the central 
tenet in statutory interpretation that the text is paramount, and thus to the new 
textualists’ belief that pursing evidence of legislative intent beyond the evidence that 
the text provides is highly problematic.     
Although the traditional preference for speech over writing is highly 
problematic in statutory interpretation, it is noteworthy that the very notion of any 
distinction between the two is never discussed in the law.  Rarely is any mention 
made of the fact that that spoken and written language is not the same thing.  Yet, 
new textualists find themselves constantly embroiled in debates over what written 
words “mean” versus what the legislature “intended.”  Perhaps even without 
understanding what they are fighting against, they place considerable emphasis on 
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“the law” as the written words actually adopted by the legislature and signed by the 
chief executive.  Indeed, in the new textualists’ view, it is precisely because statutory 
text is produced by an intricate process in which alternative texts are discussed and 
rejected, one cannot legitimately rely on legislators’ statements in the course of the 
process as proof of meaning.  Instead, the sole evidence we have of “the law” is that 
which is written down.  What the new textualists are fighting against is, arguably, the 
subconscious preference for spoken language and the perception of a marked 
distinction between the two. 
For the new textualists especially, a preliminary reaction to Derrida’s 
conclusion thus might be an instinct to extend it even beyond where Derrida was 
willing to go.  If in the debate over statutory meaning, the written text is indisputably 
paramount, the speech/writing binary should be reversed and the text exalted.  This 
view accords with a common translation of Derrida’s famous quote in Of 
Grammatology: “Il n’y a pas de hors-texte,” often translated as “there is nothing 
outside the text.”72  In principle, new textualists likely would agree.73  Indeed, a 
number of cases employing a new textualist jurisprudence expressly mark the 
parameters between the words of a statute and “everything outside.”  And even where 
the intent of the legislature – the touchstone of statutory interpretation – seems largely 
at odds with the text, the text retains primacy. 
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.,74 
illustrates this viewpoint.  There, the Court was called upon to interpret a statute 
requiring ship owners to pay their workers immediately upon discharge or be 
responsible for “a sum equal to one day’s pay for each and every day during which 
payment is delayed . . . .”  At the time of Mr. Griffin’s discharge, his employer 
improperly withheld $412 in back pay.  The Court found in Mr. Griffin’s favor.  
Reading the statute literally, they determined that given the years it had taken for the 
case to be litigated and appealed, Mr. Griffin was owed over $300,000 for the $412 
that had been wrongfully withheld.   
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, recognized that “[i]t is probably 
true that Congress did not precisely envision the grossness of the difference in this 
case between the actual wages withheld and the amount of the award required by the 
statute.”  Nevertheless, in the spirit of new textualism, Justice Rehnquist reasoned 
that: 
Laws enacted with good intention, when put to the test, 
frequently, and to the surprise of the lawmaker himself, 
turn out to be mischievous, absurd or otherwise 
objectionable.  But in such cases, the remedy lies with 
the lawmaking authority . . . .  The remedy for any 
dissatisfaction with the results in particular cases lies 
with Congress and not with this Court.  Congress may 
amend the statute; we may not.75         
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For the Griffin Court, Congress’s intent was expressed in, and only in, the words of 
the statute.  Any other inquiry into authorial intent simply had no role in the Court’s 
interpretive process.    
On the surface, therefore, it might seem that the Court’s conclusion adheres to 
the above-quoted Derridean principle that “there is nothing outside the text.”  
Derrida’s goal, however, was not to invert the speech/writing binary, but to expose its 
subconscious implications.  The abovementioned translation of Derrida’s famous 
quote only reinforces the kind of polarity that Derrida sought to undo; in fact, it 
preserves the very opposition between “inside” and “outside” that the statement seeks 
to dismantle.76   
The more legitimately Derridean interpretation is one that transcends this 
distinction between the text and that which is “other” than it.  In a Derridean world 
devoid of binary oppositions, the point is not that nothing of relevance exists outside 
the text but, rather, that nothing is outside the text.  In other words, everything of 
relevance that initially might have pre-existed the text is subsumed within the text 
itself.  The text is its own presence that embodies not only itself but all that is outside 
it as well.  Remarkably, this conclusion seems to be precisely what the new textualists 
mean when they say, as in Griffin, that Congress’s intent is already embodied in the 
words of the statute.  To the extent that legislative intent is and can be relevant, it is 
already captured by the statutory language.   
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Griffin also demonstrates the presence of another embedded distinction: 
authorial intent versus textual meaning.  For new textualists, meaning and the 
author’s intent typically are not presented as one and the same, and this dichotomy 
has major implications in statutory interpretation.  The debate is often cast in terms of 
a disagreement over whether and to what extent the actual intent of the legislature 
should play a role in statutory interpretation.  In a series of recent articles on statutory 
interpretation published following a symposium on the topic, a number of scholars 
tackled this and other questions of meaning construction, such as whether 
collectivities such as legislatures can have intentions; whether judges can possibly 
discover them; and whether legislative intent should play a role at all in the process of 
statutory interpretation.77    
Certainly, legislative intent has been of paramount importance to scholars that 
have taken either a purposivist or intentionalist approach to statutory interpretation, a 
combination of which dominated twentieth century jurisprudence prior to the 
introduction of new textualism.78  As Roscoe Pound, Dean of Harvard Law School 
from 1916-36 described it: 
the object of genuine interpretation is to discover the 
rule which the lawmaker intended to establish; to 
discover the intention which the law-maker made the 
rule, or the sense which he attached to the words 
wherein the rule is expressed.  Its object is to enable 
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others to derive from the language used “the same idea 
which the author intended to convey.”79
 
Yet, the question of intent is often bound up with (and sometimes purposely masked 
by) the search for statutory “meaning.”  Thus, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
noted over a century ago: we “do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only 
what the statute means.”80
A finer point regarding meaning and intent is lurking here beneath the surface. 
Derrida’s goal was not only to deconstruct the speech/writing binary simply to 
deconstruct it, but to show that any word – indeed any linguistic utterance – holds a 
multiplicity of meanings beyond what many readers realize and, more importantly, 
beyond what the author may have intended.  Of course, statutory interpretation cannot 
rest simply on the recognition of multiple meanings, but it can and should take into 
account Derrida’s observation that writing is simply unable to sustain a univocal 
meaning.  If, as Derrida posits, language and texts are so complex in their relationship 
that any word is always subject to meanings beyond what the author intended – as 
may have been the case with “pharmakon” and Plato’s followers or perhaps even 
Plato himself – then the only legitimate inquiry should be about the text itself. 
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IV. Communication as a Joint Activity 
 
Cognitive linguistic theory further helps sort through some of the “mess” of 
current statutory interpretation by identifying and exploring the underlying patterns of 
thought involved in meaning construction.  As discussed above, ascertaining meaning 
from any written text is no easy process, and the sheer number of approaches to this 
interpretive enterprise, both in the law and in other discourses, is evidence alone of 
the challenge a reader faces when she encounters the words of an author not in her 
presence and is expected to say what those words mean.   
What the literary theories discussed above have in common is a rigid 
insistence on words “having” meaning in the first instance – whether or not arbitrarily 
assigned.  But, as the wealth of literature analyzing the conduit metaphor suggests,  
“Meaning, is not something that that words ‘have’ or that readers “find. . . . Meaning 
is what emerges when linguistic and cultural understandings and experiences are 
brought to bear on the text.”81  This notion should be attractive to proponents of 
contemporary literary theory, including advocates of deconstruction theory, because 
the focus is not simply on linguistic forms.  Instead, cognitive linguistics has shown 
that language expressions are not determined by some absolute truth and, thus, that 
meaning is not a consequence of the relationship between a linguistic sign and some 
external reality.   
Practices placing undue reliance on linguistic forms obscure the fact that 
something more is going on “behind the scenes” of language use.  That “something 
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more” involves looking behind linguistic forms and language structure to the “deep 
features of our thinking, cognitive processes, and social communication” that are 
manifested in — and triggered by — our linguistic expressions.82  But neither is 
meaning entirely arbitrary, nor purely a matter of differences between signs in a self-
contained system.  Instead, “[l]ike postmodern theory, [] cognitive approaches [to 
meaning construction] recognize that human cognition and the symbolic systems 
through which it works are neither unified nor primarily rational.” 83  In this respect, 
cognitive linguistic theory further enriches the vocabulary that literary theory offers 
to lawyers and judges seeking to understand the way in which language produces 
meaning.   
Furthermore, because its focus is on the mind’s patterns and their 
predictability, cognitive theory may be an even more attractive theory for use in legal 
arenas.  Specifically, because cognitive linguistic theory focuses on language as the 
product of an embodied mind – on our experience as individuals living in a body and 
interacting as such with the physical world – it identifies constraints on linguistic 
meaning and meaning construction that much of contemporary literary theory avoids 
in its sweeping rejection of objective Truth.84  In this way, cognitive theory arguably 
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can “supplement” deconstruction, specifically, by adding “analysis of the patterns that 
do emerge from cognitive processes.”85   
That language may be subject to a multiplicity of meaning therefore is not the 
same as saying that there are no tools to reign in interpretation.  Instead, the 
constraints that Justice Scalia and adherents to new textualism seek simply may come 
from elsewhere – not from fictitious boundaries ascribed to language in an attempt to 
manufacture artificial clarity.  Though any theory of an embodied nature of meaning 
is fundamentally inconsistent with language as a system of differences, as discussed 
above in Section III, jurists already employ aspects of contradictory theories about 
meaning production.  As this paper suggested at the outset, the solution may not 
involve unifying the various approaches into one meta-theory – indeed, that would 
seem an impossible task given the sheer number of approaches already fully 
engrained in legal theory – but to establish a better repertoire of tools for combating 
the problems impossible to avoid in the process of construing meaning. 
Cognitive theory already has established a foothold in legal circles. Steven 
Winter, a law professor engaged in “Cognitive Legal Studies,” proposes that “a better 
theory of the mind should facilitate a better understanding of the products of the 
mind.  Law is one of those products and, so, should be amenable to an analysis 
informed by the tools of cognitive theory.”86  Specifically, cognitive theory provides 
something like a “map” of the pragmatic knowledge that influences the way we think 
and make decisions.  It thus offers an: 
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ability to make explicit the unconscious criteria and 
cognitive operations that structure and constitute our 
judgment.  It is by laying bare these cognitive structures 
and their impact on our reasoning that we can best aid 
legal actors – whether advocates or decision-makers – 
who wish to understand the law better so that they can 
act more effectively.87
 
Applying aspects of cognitive theory to statutory interpretation is not a novel 
proposition.  “Pragmatics,” a field of study within linguistics that focuses on actual 
use of language, previously has been applied to the enterprise by a number of well-
respected legal scholars.88  Twenty years ago, law professor M.B.W. Sinclair, 
explored the application to legal statutes of social conventions analyzed by the 
philosopher H.P. Grice, which themselves date back to the 1970s.  Sinclair’s goal was 
to examine the extent to which Grice’s relatively basic and well-established theories 
of communication apply to legislative speech.   
Grice’s theories and observations have roots as far back as John Locke and 
continue to influence the study of language use today. 89  They are not hard-and-fast 
rules but basic principles to which people engaged in conversation naturally adhere.  
In fact, they apply to all social and non-social interaction, not just to language.  These 
maxims are, according to Grice, the very elements of rational behavior.  Their 
relevance to the enterprise of statutory construction thus should be readily apparent.  
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After all, legislatures, when composing legal statutes, are initiating communications 
with an audience, whether that audience is constituents who will be bound by their 
words or the judges that will be asked to interpret them.   
Grice’s primary and most general principle is the “cooperative principle.”  
This principle operates on the premise that participants in a conversation act 
rationally and cooperatively, with the shared goal of making communication 
successful.  Certainly, legislatures are presumed to act rationally and thus according 
to this principle; indeed, it would be odd if their goal in enacting laws was not to 
maximize their effort of being understood and followed.  
One immediately apparent problem with the application of Grice, though, is 
his reliance on face-to-face conversation as the prototypical model of communication.  
Herbert Clark, who builds on Gricean pragmatics by maintaining a focus on language 
as an intention to communicate, specifically anticipates the charge that his own 
pragmatic approach to finding meaning in language use does not work as well for 
written communication.  He expressly notes that joint actions require coordination 
between participants “whether the participants are talking face to face or are writing 
to each other over vast stretches of time and space.”90  All settings are derivative in 
one respect or another of that paradigm.   Clark also notes: “Writing and reading are 
no less joint actions for the lack of synchrony. . . . In conversation, speakers and 
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addresses synchronize the phases of their actions.  In asynchronous settings, speakers 
try to make processing optimal for their addresses.”91   
Perhaps more than providing a plausible justification for the application of 
pragmatic principles to written text, Clark may help bridge the perceived gap between 
using language in conversation and using it for legislative ends.  As Clark posits, the 
use of language is not an end in itself but, rather, the vehicle by which broader 
activities — such as purchasing goods, playing games, and exchanging stories — are 
carried out.  All of these activities are “joint activities” in which two or more people, 
in socially defined roles, simultaneously perform individual actions and take place in 
larger coordinated endeavors.  In addition, Clark specifically recognizes that, “[i]n 
some written settings, the words are selected through an institutional procedure. . . . 
Although one person may have composed the words, it is the institution – [e.g., the] 
legislature – that is ultimately responsible for approving the wording as faithful to the 
institution’s collective intentions.92
As explained above, though judges may try to escape the fact that “meaning is 
not a property of words or of the categories they signify,”93 they cannot deny that 
statutory interpretation is necessarily a two-party process: the legislature writes the 
laws, and the judiciary must interpret them.  The notion of these processes coming 
together to produce a singular “joint activity” thus is compelling.   
                                                 
91  Clark, 90. 
92  Clark, 7.  The prior discussion of Gricean pragmatics also supports this view.  
93  Winter, 103. 
 53
Certainly, the traditional purposivism and intentionalism approaches 
recognize that it is the judge (the reader) who must interpret the text, but they require 
her to do so first by uncovering and then by animating the purpose and intent of the 
legislature (the author).   Under these interpretive models, “textual meaning and 
authorial intent are not separable concepts: the text has no autonomous significance” 
beyond the author’s intent.94  These approaches thus fit neatly within Clark’s notion 
that language use always involves both a speaker’s meaning and an addressee’s 
understanding.  And, they comport with the principle that meaning is a two-party 
enterprise that involves coordination between the lawmaker that makes the rules and 
the judge whose job it is to discover the meaning the lawmaker intended to convey. 
Equally persuasive is Clark’s view of successful communication as something 
greater than the sum of a speaker speaking and a listener listening — it is the joint 
action that emerges when they perform those acts in coordination — much like a 
piano duet performed by two people each playing different parts.95  Both participants 
need to perform individually and together for the work of communication to be 
successful.96   
This notion brings us back to the Gricean principle of cooperation.  In addition 
to the cooperative principle, Grice posits several specific maxims applicable to 
conversation.  A specific example of how these maxims operate, and their relevance 
to legislative speech, is illuminating.  Grice’s first specific maxim is the “quantity” 
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maxim.  According to the principle of quantity, contributions to a conversation should 
be only as informative as required, no more, no less.  Here, the assumption is that 
people in conversation will say enough to be understood and to further the 
conversation, but not so much as to provide superfluous information.97   
The “quantity” maxim presumes that the words a speaker chooses to utter are 
intended to “say something,” and also that, if a particular piece of information is 
important to the conversation, the speaker would utter that, too.  For example, if a 
speaker sees a car crash at an intersection and reports to a listener that he has just seen 
a “big crash with three cars,” the listener will assume that the crash involved only 
three cars.  If, in fact, the crash also involved a tanker-truck, a motorcycle, and a 
Greyhound bus, then the speaker violated the maxim of quantity.98
As applied to legislative utterances, Grice’s maxims justify the common 
practice, even among new textualists, of relying on well-established textual or 
grammatical “canons” of statutory interpretation.  The canons are accepted 
conventions that have been developed over time in the case law for reading legal 
texts.  The most accepted conventions are known as “textual canons” of statutory 
interpretation, which make certain assumptions of meaning derived from the text 
itself.  For example, “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” is a textual canon 
providing that the legislature’s express identification of certain things in a statute 
must be read to exclude other like things not enumerated.  According to this canon, a 
statute expressly prohibiting “concealed guns and knives” should be read to exclude 
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other potential weapons, such as hand grenades or axes.  The logic is that if the 
legislature had the more general category of “dangerous weapons” on its mind, it 
must have considered its options and would not have specified some weapons on the 
prohibited at the exclusion of others unless it meant to.      
The “expressio unius” canon really amounts to a restatement of Grice’s 
maxim of quantity.  For example, if a statute provides that “no one under eighteen 
may operate a motor vehicle on a public street,” the expressio unius principle 
suggests that a person under eighteen remains free to operate a tractor in a farmer’s 
field.99  Because the legislature specifically included “public street,” we can infer that 
it meant to exclude “farmer’s field.”  As in the example above of the car crash, if the 
legislature also meant to include farms in the scope of the prohibition but articulated 
only public streets, it would have violated the maxim of quantity.   
The quantity maxim also gives rise to the presumption that each enacted 
provision of a statute is meaningful.  If a particular provision seems repetitive, the 
quantity maxim suggests that, rather than assume the legislature said the same thing 
two different ways, one should try to find separate meaning in the seemingly 
repetitive provision.  In other words, one should not presume that the legislature 
simply made a gratuitous utterance.100  Exactly this presumption underlies the textual 
canon that “every word in a statute should be given meaning.”101   
                                                 
99  Miller, 1196. 
100  Sinclair, 394. 
101  See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).  
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Grice’s theory also offers assistance to new textualist judges seeking to 
employ the concept of “ordinary meaning.”  From Grice’s “cooperative principle” 
comes his theory of “implicature.”  Implicatures are inferences generated from the 
assumption that a speaker is adhering to the cooperative principle and related maxims 
and intends his words to be interpreted in an ordinary sense.  However, we can infer 
more about the semantic content of expressed words simply by the fact that the 
speaker chose certain words, and not others, at a particular juncture in the 
conversation.102       
The discussion in Smith v. United States, one of the trilogy of cases that 
required the Supreme Court to interpret the “uses or carries a firearm” provision 
discussed above in connection with Muscarello and Bailey, highlights the potential 
use of Grice’s theory of implicature.  In Smith, the defendant “used” a firearm by 
trading it to the seller as partial payment for drugs.103  The Court held that the 
enhanced sentencing provision applied, even though the defendant did not “use” the 
firearm as a weapon. According to the Court, he nevertheless “used” it as an article of 
barter.  In dissent, Justice Scalia compared the situation to “using” a cane, saying that 
“to use an instrumentality ordinarily means to use it for its intended purpose” – i.e., 
for walking.   
However, if A tells B that he “used” a cane, is it necessarily obvious that A 
meant “used” for walking?  What if B asked how A broke the window, and A 
                                                 
102  Sinclair, 380-81. 
103  Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993). 
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responded, “I used a cane?”104  Grice’s theory of implicature supports the 
presumption that A was not simply attempting to derail the conversation by suddenly 
announcing to B that he walks with a cane.  Instead, we should assume that his 
answer intended to further the conversation.  As a result, we understand the utterance 
“I used a cane” to mean that A broke the window with the cane – not the primary 
purpose for using a cane, but an “ordinary” one nonetheless.  Such a discussion would 
preserve a focus on ordinary meaning; however, in this example, the process of 
finding “meaning” in statutory text is tied more to the “performance” of legislative 
pronouncements as speech acts than to “the abstract linguistic tokens found in 
dictionaries.”105
These theories provide a vocabulary to explain the use of traditional canons of 
statutory interpretation based on real principles of conversation, as opposed to 
malleable tools of persuasion invoked in hindsight by judges to support a 
predetermined conclusion.  In addition, they can highlight more precisely the specific 
point about which there is disagreement or on which the court must render a 
conclusion.  As a result, principles already in use by judges interpreting statutory 
language are rendered more reliable and legitimate: 
More importantly, in those cases in which this theory of 
pragmatics can determine the applicability of a rule or 
canon of construction, the determination will be on 
grounds independent of the choice of outcome.  It is 
thus more likely to produce a result in accord with the 
                                                 
104  Marmor, 2073. 
105  Sinclair, 420. 
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legislature’s design than with the predilections of the 
judge, should those two not coincide.106
 
Their relevance, moreover, like all of the theories discussed here in lies not in their 
ability to solve the problems inherent in statutory interpretation by making the 
process more mechanical, but in their ability to make conscious the mental processes 
already at play in an endeavor that requires “some of the most complex mental 
processing that ordinary human beings are called upon to perform.”107    
   
 
                                                 
106  Sinclair, 409-10. 
107  Mullins, 4.  Mullins likewise recognizes that “[s]tatutory interpretation is a process of 
the mind, not the application of a yardstick,” and that cognitive linguistic theory can help 
reveal how our minds work when confronted with the complexities of processing written 
statutory words and explaining their application to real cases.  
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Conclusion 
Amidst the contradictions and assumptions embedded in the prevailing 
statutory interpretive practices, one thing is certain: the need for rational and self-
conscious constraints.  Without them, the fear is that “judges and other legal actors 
will be free to impose their personal values or political preferences.”108  If modern 
jurisprudence and the specific cases discussed herein teach us anything, however, it is 
that these sought-after constraints can be very difficult to locate and, once located, 
even tougher to apply. 
Current practices for interpreting statutory text are quick to ignore the 
complexities attendant to the process of ascertaining meaning and instead focus 
considerable attention on its product – on the conclusions one can reach, in some 
cases, seemingly by the will to divine essential meaning.  Observations and lessons 
from other disciplines that have studied similar interpretive issues receive little 
attention, and momentous conclusions are reached on the basis of dictionary entries 
and erroneous assumptions about the way language operates.  Though the tacit 
assumptions underlying even the most extreme textualist approach to statutory 
construction suggest that “meaning” can be difficult to grasp, current methods seem 
largely unwilling to pursue a deeper understanding of the assumptions that the quest 
inevitably entails.   
Insofar as transparency is valued above all else in judicial decision-making, it 
makes little sense for judges and the broader legal community to continue to ignore 
                                                 
108  Winter, 7. 
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the fact that insights from non-legal disciplines that have long grappled with the 
problem of meaning making are not only relevant to the exercise of statutory 




Aprill, Ellen P. and Nancy Staudt.  “Theories of Statutory Interpretation (and Their 
Limits).”  Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 38 (2005): 1899-1907.  
Westlaw, Thomson West (28 March 2006). 
 
Balkin, Jack.  “Deconstruction’s Legal Career.”  Cardozo Law Review 27, no. 2 
(2005): 101-22. 
 
Balkin, Jack.  “What is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?”  Michigan Law Review 90 
(1992): 1966-90. 
 
Binder, Guyora and Robert Weisberg.  Literary Criticisms of Law.  Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000. 
 
Cheryl Boudreau, Matthew D. McCubbins, and Daniel B. Rodriguez.  “Statutory 
Interpretation and the Interntional(ist) Stance.” Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review 38 (2005): 2131-46.  Westlaw, Thomson West (28 March 2006). 
 
Clark, Herbert H.  Using Language.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
 
Crane, Mary Thomas.  Shakespeare’s Brain.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001.   
 
Derrida, Jacques.  “From Dissemination.”  In The Norton Anthology of Theory and 
Criticism, edited by Vincent B. Leitch, 1822-30.  New York: Norton, 2001. 
 
Derrida, Jacques.  “From Of Grammatology.”  In The Norton Anthology of Theory 
and Criticism, edited by Vincent B. Leitch, 1830-76.  New York: Norton, 
2001. 
 
Easterbrook, Frank H. (1983).  “Statutes’ Domains.”  University of Chicago Law 
Review, 50 (1983): 533-52. 
 
Easterbrook, Frank H.  “Some Tasks in Understanding Law Through the Lens of 
Public Choice.”  International Review of Law and Economics 12 (1992): 284-
288. 
 
Eskridge, William, N., Jr.  “The New Textualism.”  UCLA Law Review 37 (1990): 
621-691. 
 
Eskridge, William N., Jr. and Philip P. Frickey.  Legislation: Statutes and the 
Creation of Public Policy.  St. Paul (MN): West Publishing, 1995. 
 
 62
Eskridge, William N. Jr.  “All About Words: Early Understandings of the ‘Judicial 
Power’ in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806.”  Columbia University Law 
Review 101 (2001): 990-1106. 
 
Fauconnier, Gilles.  “Backstage Cognition.”  New chapter for the reissue of 
Fauconnier, G.  Mental Spaces: Aspects of meaning construction in natural 
language.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
 
Fauconnier, Gilles.  Introduction to Methods and Generalizations.  To appear in T. 
Jansen and G. Redeker, eds.  Scope and Foundations of Cognitive Linguistics.  
The Hague: Mouton DeGruyter, 1999.  Cognitive Linguistics Research Series.  
<http://cogweb.ucla.edu/Abstracts/Fauconnier_99.html> (2 April 2006).  
 
Fauconnier, Gilles and Mark Turner.  The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and 
the Mind’s Hidden Complexities.  New York: Basic Books, 2002. 
 
Grice, H.P.  “Logic and Conversation.”  In Speech Acts, Syntax and Semantics III, 
edited by P. Cole and J. Morgan , 41-58.  New York: Academic Press, 1989. 
 
Hall, Kira.  “Performativity.”  Journal of Linguistic Anthropology 9 (2000): 184-87.   
 
Hand, Learned.  “Is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision?,” The Spirit of Liberty: 
Papers and Addresses of Learned Hand 105 (3d ed. 1977).  Quoted in 
Amanda L Tyler, “Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons,” Northwestern 
University Law Review 99 (2005): 1404. 
 
Howard, Jennifer. “The Fragmentation of Literary Theory.”  Chronicle of Higher 
Education, 16 December 2005, A12. 
 
Kaiser, David Aram and Paul Lufkin.  “Deconstructing Davis v. United States: 
Intention and Meaning in Ambiguous Requests for Counsel.”  Hastings 
Constitutional Law Quarterly 32 (2005): 737-67.  Westlaw, Thomson West 
(21 February 2006).  
 
Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson.  Metaphors We Live By.  Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1980. 
 
Leitch, Vincent B., gen. ed.  The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism.  New 
York: Norton, 2001. 
 
Marmor, Andrei.  “The Immorality of Textualism.” Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review 38 (2005): 2063-79.  Westlaw, Thomson West (10 April 2006). 
 
 63
Miller, Geoffrey P.  “Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation.”  Wisconsin Law 
Review 1990 (1990): 1179-1227. Westlaw, Thomson West (9 March 2006). 
 
Mullins, Morell E., Sr.  “Tools, Not Rules: the Heuristic Nature of Statutory 
Interpretation.” Journal of Legislation 30 (2003):1-76.  Westlaw, Thomson 
West (10 April 2006). 
 
Nietzsche, Friedrich.  “From On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense.”  In The 
Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, edited by Vincent B. Leitch, 874-
84. New York: Norton, 2001. 
 
Posner, Richard.  Review of Literary Criticisms of Law, by Guyora Binder and 
Robert Weisberg.  Stanford Law Review 53 (2000-2001): 195-208.  
HeinOnline, William S. Hein & Co., Inc. (6 March 2006). 
 
Plato.  “From Phaedrus.”  In The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, edited 
by Vincent B. Leitch, 81-85. New York: Norton, 2001. 
 
Plato.  “From Republic, Book X.”  In The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, 
edited by Vincent B. Leitch, 67-80. New York: Norton, 2001. 
 
Saussure, Ferdinand de.  “From Course in General Linguistics.”  In The Norton 
Anthology of Theory and Criticism, edited by Vincent B. Leitch, 960-77. New 
York: Norton, 2001. 
 
Sinclair, M.B.W.  “Law and Language: The Role of Pragmatics in Statutory 
Interpretation.”  University of Pittsburgh Law Review 46 (1985): 373-420.  
Westlaw, Thomson West (9 March 2006). 
 
Solan, Lawrence.  “Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory 
Cases.”  Wisconsin Law Review 1997 (1997): 235-83.  Westlaw, Thomson 
West (9 March 2006). 
 
Solan, Lawrence.  “The New Textualists’ New Text.”  Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review 38 (2005): 2027-62.  Westlaw, Thomson West (28 March 2006).    
 
Solan, Lawrence.  “When Judges Use the Dictionary,” American Speech 68 (1993): 
54-55. 
 
United States Supreme Court cases: 
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366(1999).   
Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1993). 
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991). 
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982). 
 64
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  
McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931). 
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998). 
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993). 
 
Walker, John M., Jr.  “Judicial Tendencies in Statutory Construction: Differing Views 
on the Role of the Judge.”  New York University Annual Survey of American 
Law 58 (2001): 203-239.  Westlaw, Thomson West (21 February 2006). 
 
Winter, Steven L.  A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and Mind.  Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001. 
 
 65
